The elements of music relevant for copyright protection by Rahmatian, Andreas
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2755008 
This article first appeared as:  
 
A. Rahmatian (2015), ‘The elements of music relevant for copyright protection’, in: 
A. Rahmatian (ed.), Concepts of Music and Copyright: How Music Perceives Itself 
and How Copyright Perceives Music (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), pp. 78-122. 	  
 
 
 
The Elements of Music relevant for Copyright 
Protection 
 
© 2015, Dr Andreas Rahmatian, University of Glasgow 
 
[p. 78] 
1 Music as a living art: performance and text 
 
The protection of music by copyright is a fascinating conglomerate of simplifying 
reconceptualisations, approximations and auxiliary measures that remodel the 
phenomenon of music in a way that renders it intelligible to the concepts of law. In 
truth, copyright law has no genuine understanding of the nature of music as an art 
form;1 it attaches to certain aspects of music which it declares as normatively relevant 
and thus ascertains building blocks of the legal protection system. Generally this 
method works satisfactorily, mainly because lawyers (and court decisions) frequently 
disregard the artistic phenomenon of music itself as a starting point for protection. 
They presuppose ‘music’ as a ‘black box’ and concentrate on, say, the score as a 
normatively relevant aspect for protection purposes. In most cases, however, their 
focus is on assignment and licensing rights in relation to specific musical works. In 
this way music is considered as an object of legal transactions, especially as an object 
of transferable property. This is a result of the translation process of music into legal 
categories. Here we look at the elements and stages of this process. We therefore have 
to start with some attempts at the definition and description of the phenomenon of 
music. [p. 79] 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See also Craig and Laroche (2014: 44-45). 
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1.1 Music and time 
Music is embellished time.2 I maintain this aphoristic definition3 and for present 
purposes I consider its inherent imprecisions as a virtue. One may render this 
definition more neutrally as ‘music is fashioned time’, but it is in the nature of music 
that this fashioning is always an enhancement (at least an intended one) of the time 
experience.4 Music has no clearly discernable aim beyond that, and the idea of 
‘enhancement’ is deliberately diffuse. Time, supplemented by music, obtains an 
aesthetic quality: it is ‘aesthetic time’.5 It is not directed at the existence and quality of 
a specific object or at a possible purpose.6 For the present conceptual discussion it is 
irrelevant whether a given individual does or does not like a specific piece of music. 
There is no need either to go into aesthetic discussions in the tradition of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as to what ‘beautiful’ really means,7 particularly 
with regard to music.8 We will see later that aesthetic or artistic qualities are also 
irrelevant from a legal perspective. Both definitions assume, however, that the most 
fundamental constituent of music is time. This means, time is not just presupposed, 
but the art form of music must deal with the problem of time actively as part of 
making the art.9 Music can be seen as a temporal structure, not as a structure in time: 
the structure unfolds in time, this is its very nature. Time is not the framework for 
what happens in it (structure in time). Music is rather intrinsically a time-bound 
process [p. 80] (temporal structure).10 So music is a process as an aspect of time 
(dynamic), not an object or product within the framework of time (static), like a statue 
or an architectural work. Such objects are obviously also subjected to the influence of 
time (ageing etc.), but time is here framework, not constituting element. If we could 
stop time, there would be no music, but a statue would still be here, and even one 
image of a movement in a dance, although we would obviously not be able to 
perceive it and register the perception in our mind, as this would also require the flow 
of time.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Even where the element of ‘embellishment’ is deliberately removed, for example in experiments with 
time frame by John Cage (e.g. his 4’33’’) it still refers to that idea as a negation of it, and it is an 
inevitable emphasis of the element of time as the central constitutive factor.  
3 First in Rahmatian (2005: 272). 
4 From the perspective of a utilitarian or economist one could say: music is value-added time, but I 
refuse this terminology. On the ‘aesthetic experience’ of music, see Coker (1972: 24-28). 
5 Stambaugh (1964: 274). Whether this aesthetic quality is the primary aim (or an aim at all) of music 
in a given situation depends on the function of the specific piece of music (for dancing, worshipping, 
for example).  
6 This argument is influenced by Kant’s discussion on the arts in general in his Critique of Judgment 
(Kritik der Urteilskraft), book 1 (Kant 1974: 129-134) [A24-32/B24-32]. 
7 Kristeller (1952: 17). 
8 Scruton (1997: 369-379), Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch Schönen (1902: 72-83). 
9 Adorno, Über einige Relationen zwischen Musik und Malerei (2003a: 628). 
10 Stambaugh (1964: 266-267). See also Barron (2006: 39-40) quoting Herder and Humboldt on music 
as an art form that works ‘in the sequence of time’. 
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Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology11 sees music as an example of the 
inner awareness of time. The event of a sound is superseded by the mental retention 
(memory) of the sound event that has just passed. So the present is extended beyond 
the physical event (the specific sound) by retention of the event in the immediate past 
and by pro-tention of the immediately expected event (the difference being that the 
retention corresponds to a fading of real experience, while the pro-tension relates to 
expectations that may or may not be fulfilled, and so does not directly correspond to 
real experience). According to Husserl perception operates in a fourfold sense: (a) the 
perception of, for instance, the whistle of a pipe, (b) the actual sound of the whistle as 
to its contents, especially duration and sound colour, (c) the present of the tone and 
the perception of the correlation of the tone with the tones of the immediate past, (d) 
the perception of the awareness of time in the present, e.g. the whistle tone appearing 
in the now. The immediate past is shadowed by the occurrence of the event in the 
present.12 Although one can never listen to a piece of music as a whole at the same 
time as one can look at a painting as a whole at the same time13 one nevertheless 
perceives the whole piece of music as a complete entity because one recognises the 
sounds of a [p. 81] melody in a correlation to one another. Only when the last sound 
fades away the piece is perceived as being in the past.14  
 
1.2 Music and space 
The central role of time in music is obvious. However, there are spatial qualities, in 
that, first of all, music sounds in a space.15 The sound expands in the air of a room, is 
subjected to acoustical refractions; there is a reverberation, an echo – all of which is 
central to the location of sounds and the musical experience of the listener and the 
musician alike. It appears here already that music means interaction between the 
sound and a listener,16 being the musician himself or the member of an audience. But 
apart from the acoustical phenomena in the physical space there is also a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie (2009: 6), for the definition of transcendental 
phenomenology as ‘eidetic’ science. 
12  Husserl, Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (2000: 25-27, 63, 99, 101). On the 
reproduction of music heard at an earlier point in time, see Husserl (2000: 42-43). 
13 Because in case of a painting everything is at the same time, see Adorno, Über einige Relationen 
zwischen Musik und Malerei (2003a: 631). Even if one looks at a section of a musical score which 
comes closest to a depiction by an image a painting gives, the difference remains that a score reflects a 
visualised flow of time, while a (figurative) painting reflects a frozen visual scene, unless one considers 
the score as a graphic image, detached from its musical purpose. 
14 Husserl, Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (2000: 32).  
15 Not according to Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, book 3, § 52 (2008: 352), for 
whom music is ‘perceived solely and entirely in and through time, to the complete exclusion of the 
space.’ 
16 Cook (1992: 10). 
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psychological space.17 The perception of movement requires listening in a space 
(physical) but sound itself almost always appears as being in motion (psychological) – 
as it really is physically (air waves). The frequency and the sound colour or timbre of 
a tone are also perceived in a notional ‘space’: high and bright tones higher up, low 
and dull tones lower down.18 But that is culturally dependent. African peoples would 
refer to low sounds as ‘big’ sounds and call high sounds ‘small’ sounds.19 This is 
nevertheless familiar to Western cultures: for example, in Prokofiev’s Peter and the 
Wolf (1936) nobody would expect the big wolf being represented by the flute and the 
small bird by the lower registers of the French horn.  
 
1.3 Music and music notation  
The terms ‘lower octaves’ or ‘higher octaves’ also connote a certain spatiality, and in 
Western musical notation lower notes appear on the lower ledger lines of the stave. 
There is a notional (psychological) horizontal-spatial dimension in music, reinforced 
by the musical ‘text’, the characteristic pictorial music notation of Western music, as 
we know [p. 82] it from the usual music scores. This has prompted some 
musicologists to claim that there is a musical space in its own right and without it our 
familiar musical notation would not be possible.20 Be it as it may, but the converse 
does not apply: non-Western classical and popular music can and does exist perfectly 
well without a too complex notation system,21 or indeed without any notation at all:22 
traditional African music, for example, passes on its musical traditions through ‘oral 
notation’, a form of phonetic patterns and symbols which the musicians associate with 
syllables, words and meanings in the respective languages.23 Even Western classical 
music can perfectly well be taught through oral tradition, and in historically informed 
performance practices aspects of ‘authentic’ interpretation of early music, for example 
ornamentation, are indeed handed down orally to a significant extent, though fortified 
by academic research24 (and imitation/‘imitatio’ is an important factor in that ‘oral’ 
tradition at least). Music notation is not constitutive of music or music performance. It 
may, however, be constitutive of the composition of certain types of music in Western 
classical music in certain epochs, such as polyphonic music,25 especially in the Late 
Medieval, Renaissance and Baroque periods, where the notation was also part of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Wellek (1963: 296-299).  
18 Hornbostel (1986: 317). 
19 Kubik (1988: 1000). The example is here from Southwest Africa, but applies to numerous peoples in 
many parts of Africa.  
20 Wellek (1963: 309). 
21 Such as in (Northern) Indian classical music, see Daniélou (1949: 49-57, 82-98). 
22 Nettl (1983: 65). 
23 Kubik (1988: 87-88). 
24 See, for example, Donington (1992: 236-266) on the trill and the mordent. 
25 Adorno, Über einige Relationen zwischen Musik und Malerei (2003a: 632).  
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musical expression beyond the performative component. One can hardly imagine the 
development of the motet and other polyphonic music without notation.26 Classical 
teaching of musical composition requires the student to imagine the music to be 
composed without the aid of an instrument, so to develop the ability to compose 
music as an abstract idea first. 27  In copyright law the score has a significant 
importance irrespective of the style and type of music. [p. 83] 
 
1.4 Performance and ‘text’ 
Music is a living, performative art. It exists in, and through, performance. The score, 
if there is any, is not the music. We will see that copyright law also recognises that. 
Musical pieces are not only the work of their composers; it is the performance and the 
opportunity to listen to the performance that renders the piece into a musical work.28 
There is the presupposition that someone will hear the music (whether or not that 
happens in reality).29 However, there are also other views: what the author has created 
is already the work of music.30 In any case, the text of the score reflects the intention 
of the composer, but not conclusively, and ‘intention’ is a vague idea anyway.31 This 
touches upon the equally vague notion of the ‘musical work’ and the question of the 
limits of an ‘appropriate’ or ‘authentic’ performance of the musical work.32 With the 
beginning of the early romantic period, the role of the performer of music was 
formulated, especially by the great novelist E. T. A. Hoffmann (1776-1822) who was 
also a notable composer: for Hoffmann the real performer lives in the work of the 
composer which he has comprehended in the composer’s spirit and which he seeks to 
perform in this way, thereby holding back his own personality.33 In classical music 
that is still the prevalent opinion. 34  Different types of performances are still 
performances of the same work, presentations of the same edifice from different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 On the simultaneous nature of layers of the visual and aural texts of late-medieval motes, see e.g. 
Bent (1997: 82-84). 
27 Impressively A. B. Marx in his textbook on composition, Die Lehre von der musikalischen 
Komposition, vol. 1 (1868: 17). This presupposes the notion of an ‘inner ear’ that can ‘hear’ everything 
the notation shows. 
28 Gadamer (2003: 110); Kivy (1995: 147): ‘A performance (product) of a work simply is the work, or 
(if you are a Platonist in these matters) an instance of the work.’ (emphasis original). 
29 Butt (2010: 6).  
30 Wiora (2000: 24). 
31 Dahlhaus, Musiktheorie (1988: 100), Kivy (1995: 146). Besides this ‘intention by the composer there 
is some kind of ‘intentionality’ in the production of the score and in the very symbols of the notation. 
32 Goehr (1989: 55-58), Kivy (2007: 93, 115). See also chapter 1 by John Butt, and briefly below under 
3. 
33 Hoffmann, review of Two Trios for Pianoforte by Beethoven op. 70 (1988: 147). 
34 E.g. Brendel (2001: 367-368), on the idea of ‘Werktreue’ and reading music, ibid. (2001: 30, 32). 
See also Goehr (1989: 55). 
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viewpoints, as it were.35 However, the particularly detailed and precise notation of 
modern scores of certain types of contemporary music [p. 84] (e.g. ‘total serialism’, in 
which every parameter of pitch, duration and expression is prescribed) can restrict the 
scope of interpretation extremely, so that the text or notation itself can be regarded as 
coming close to the realisation of the work.36 The problem of the division between 
composition and its performance is also relevant to copyright law, since the musical 
work and its interpretation attach to two separate sets of rights. 
The text of the score is certainly the starting point for any performance. But 
the score can only be seen as an incomplete and imperfect representation of the music, 
a building instruction for the performance.37  Normative as the score is as the 
expression of the composer’s intention, the symbols are only a limited aid to the 
reconstitution of the intended musical sound. During the reading the symbols have to 
be synthesised to an interpretation that translates the signs into sounds in the course of 
an inner hearing.38 That is very dependent on the familiarity of the reader with the 
type of music, and its historical and cultural context.39 So even a composer may not 
be able to read (silently) another composer’s score if that other music is based on a 
completely different and unfamiliar conceptual structure.40 The same applies to music 
in several parts or voices, even where the style is well known, because the players in 
the orchestra or a string quartet must synthesise the different parts to a musical whole 
in an intelligent interpretation process which involves much mutual listening of the 
players.41 The listener is also part of the interpretation process, at least where she is 
the musician herself who reacts to the immediate auditory feedback.42 Music always 
happens between produced sound and listening ear or mind, that is, psychologically 
and sociologically, between player and listener. One can distinguish three different 
types of listeners (and music catering for these three [p. 85] types), the ‘hearers’, the 
‘intentional listeners’, and the ‘implied listeners’ who create a specific self over the 
duration of the listening experience and map consciously the music in time.43  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Gadamer (2003: 118). A separate, but related, point is where a ‘performance’ departs so significantly 
from a ‘right’ representation, that the new work is derivative, or a variation of the pre-existing work, 
but artistically sufficiently independent. See below under 4. 
36 Or, pointedly, it is the realisation already, according to Adorno, Musik und Technik (2003a: 233). 
Another example would be the fixation of ‘tape music’ in the late 1950s) which is fixed without even 
needing a score. 
37 Rahmatian (2005: 273). 
38 This is a process of understanding, both in the case of silent reading and of listening to performed 
music, see Gadamer (2003: 91). 
39 Cook (1992: 122-128). 
40 That was apparently the case with Gustav Mahler trying to make sense of Arnold Schoenberg’s first 
string quartet which Schoenberg showed Mahler, see Cook (1992: 129), note 7. 
41 This has already been remarked by Hoffmann, review of Coriolan Ouverture by Beethoven op. 62 
(1988: 102). 
42 Cook (1992: 10-11, 127); Gadamer (2003: 110) with the example of chamber music. 
43 Butt (2010: 8-9). 
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1.5 The philosophers’ problem with the temporary, ineffable nature of music 
Philosophers generally had problems with the intangible, fleeting, ephemeral quality 
of music. Several philosophers have developed ideas about music, few really 
competently (particularly Rousseau and Adorno), and only in very few cases music 
was a central part of their philosophical system. The most prominent example of the 
last category was Schopenhauer. While for Schopenhauer the other arts objectify 
man’s will (and in this way depict the appearances of the world in the form of ideas), 
music depicts man’s will directly (not via the ideas): it is immediate expression of 
man’s will as a general language without concepts. Since music does not depict ideas, 
but the will, it does not display a shadow, but the will itself in its very being. Hence 
the effect of music is infinitely stronger compared to the other arts.44 From here it is 
not a great step to the interpretation of music as the most ‘romantic’ art which the 
Romantic writers maintained slightly earlier, particularly, again, Hoffmann, for whom 
music ‘is the most romantic of all the arts – one almost wants to say: alone purely 
romantic. … Music opens up to man an unknown realm; a world which has nothing in 
common with the outer world of the senses …’.45 Although Hoffmann’s emphasis is 
different from Schopenhauer (who rejected the Romantic philosophers but was of 
course familiar with Romantic theory of art), the consequence is similar. For 
Wackenroder, being full of romantic enthusiasm, no art except music is so full of 
heavenly spirit. But the musical material is at the same time organised and structured, 
a feature which unfortunately encourages educated men to doing arid and uninspiring 
analyses.46 Hegel also emphasised the realisation of the Romantic [p. 86] through 
music. By being more subjective than painting, music is the idealisation of the senses 
through the complete removal of anything spatial, so that the visual is made abstract 
and transformed to the aural and detached from the material.47  
Wackenroder’s and Hegel’s struggle with music as the most romantic, non-
visual, non-spatial and ineffable art, the epitome of the senses on the one hand, and on 
the other hand music as a most abstract and very disciplined, precise and organised 
systematic art, reflects a common and characteristic tension in reflections about 
music. Leonardo Da Vinci disposed of the unsettling qualities of music as a non-
spatial, non-visual, ephemeral time-bound art simply by postulating that ‘painting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, book 3, § 52 (2008: 339-341). See also Hamilton 
(2007: 76-78). 
45 Hoffmann, review of the Fifth Symphony by Beethoven op. 67 (1988: 23) (my translation from the 
German). 
46 Wackenroder, Das eigentümliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst (2011: 124-125). Similar metaphysical 
romantic approach to music by Robert Schumann, Schwärmbriefe (1982: 61-65).  
47 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, Einteilung (1986: 121). 
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excels and is superior in rank to music, because it does not perish immediately after 
its creation, as happens with unfortunate music’.48 Others decided to say little about 
the nature of music, but concentrated on the craft of music composition, music 
making and the anthropological development of music. One of these was Rousseau, 
who was, as is little known outside the circle of music scholars, a theoretician of 
music and minor composer besides his work as a political philosopher and homme de 
lettres. Rousseau also worked as a copyist of music scores throughout most of his life 
to supplement his income, perhaps the only real profession he had. 49  In his 
Dictionnaire de musique (1768) he discusses mainly the craft, science and 
terminology of music, and says next to nothing about the qualities of music as such. 
Only in his Essay sur les origines des langues (1781) Rousseau goes more into the 
elements of music, melody, harmony (and his aesthetic criticism of complex 
harmonies in then modern music50), but he really concentrates on the evolution of 
music from sounds and human utterances. Music has a common origin with language 
and verse: ‘… cadence and sounds are born together with syllables … verse, song, 
speech have a common origin.’51  
The eighteenth century in its fondness of the nascent natural sciences would 
have found it attractive to remove the ineffable (later: ‘Romantic’) element by 
scientific examination of music and its rational foundation (something Rousseau 
doubted), but that proved difficult. Diderot spoke of musical sounds as being abstract 
words, so that every listener can make of them what corresponds to his sentiment in a 
given point in time.52 The [p. 87] aesthetic thinking of the Scottish Enlightenment had 
little to contribute to the understanding of music,53 as had Kant.54 One may be 
tempted to think that this avoidance of a discussion of the essence of music is typical 
of the early modern period. But also the nineteenth century music theorist Adolf 
Bernhard Marx, author of a widely used textbook on the composition of music in the 
nineteenth century and influenced by the aesthetic thinking of Hoffmann and Hegel, 
says at the beginning of his four-volume treatise that the student must not succumb to 
the arbitrary choices of a dilettante and to fashionable tastes but has to study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Da Vinci (2001: 35).  
49 Gülke (1989: 370). 
50 Rousseau, Essay on the Origin of Languages (1997: 286). 
51 Rousseau, Essay on the Origin of Languages (1997: 282). 
52 Gülke (1989: 433).  
53 See especially, Lord Kames (Henry Home), Elements of Criticism, vol. 1 (1970: 166-170). Reference 
is made here to the facsimile edition of the first edition of 1762. Like Rousseau, Kames favoured 
melody over harmony. Kames’s friend, Benjamin Franklin, criticised precisely the terseness of the 
discussion on music in Kames’s Elements, see Franklin’s letter to Lord Kames, London, 2nd June 1765, 
Franklin, Papers, Vol. 12 (1968: 162).  
54 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, book 2, § 53 (Kant 1974: 269, 272-273) [A218-219, 222-223/B221, 
225-226]. See Hamilton (2007: 70-72). 
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thoroughly the works of the great masters, no matter whether they are currently 
modern or not; only that will educate him in the art and its aesthetics.55 The emphasis 
on study and craftsmanship, instead of philosophical speculation, is noticeable. In 
short: whatever music is, let us do it well according to the rules of the craft, lege artis, 
then it will speak for itself and speak to us.  
Music can be seen as a kind of language.56 That much we can certainly say if 
we follow Walter Benjamin who regarded every expression of human intellectual life 
as a kind of language; music is only one example.57 But once we want to understand 
what the language of music tells us, we are quickly thrown back to the philosophical-
aesthetic speculations outlined before.58 Musicologists have nevertheless attempted to 
detect and develop a consistent musical equivalent of a vocabulary as in a language, 
so that music can be defined as a language of expression similar to words, and is not 
just to be understood metaphorically.59 But even eminent composers were sceptical 
about that.60 While music is a [p. 88] language, it does not translate into ordinary 
language to reveal its meaning. That never stood against drawing parallels between 
music and poetry and rhetoric in particular, also for the teaching of the proper craft, 
especially during the time of the Baroque.61 
 
1.6 The lawyers’ problem with time and music 
While some philosophical theories are able to incorporate time as a central and 
foundational element of their system, law finds it extremely difficult to recognise the 
phenomenon of time. Anyone who now retorts that there are limitation of action rules, 
regulations on perpetuities in trust law, term of protection provisions for intellectual 
property rights and the like, has not understood the problem. In such rules the law 
refers to time as an extraneous structure which a legal institution or relationship is 
subjected to: after a certain period of time an action to enforce a right can no longer 
be brought, or copyright expires and the work passes into the public domain. 
However, the object as it is created/recognised by the law is itself conceptualised as 
static, immutable. Such an ‘object’ is particularly property, which is the most relevant 
legal institution in the present context of music and its protection by copyright. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 A. B. Marx, Die Lehre von der musikalischen Komposition, vol. 1 (1868: 13), Dahlhaus (1983: 34-
35). 
56 Craig and Laroche (2014: 47). 
57 Benjamin, Über Sprache überhaupt (2007: 95). 
58 Jankélévitch (2003: 11), Kivy (1991: 93), Coker (1972: 144-145). 
59 That is what is argued particularly by Cooke (1973: 10-11) et passim. 
60 Cooke (1973: 11, 15) on Stravinsky and Hindemith, although Cooke disagrees with them. Critical 
about music as a language in the usual sense is Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch Schönen (1902: 111-116). 
61 For example, Mattheson, Der vollkommene Capellmeister, §§ 8-11 (2011: 79). See also Knaus and 
Scholz (1988: 22-25) for the use of terms of rhetoric in the description of elements of musical 
compositions (motif, theme, melody etc.). 
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the law, time acts on the object, but is not part of its making. The object is like a 
statue that gradually decays over the years and will need restoration at some point. 
This is directly in conflict with the art form of music – music is above all time, as has 
been said before. Property law, and copyright law in particular, creates notional 
structures in time, but it cannot deal with a temporal structure, such as music. The 
way in which the law seeks to incorporate the purely time-bound phenomenon of 
music in a notionally timeless structure is to freeze specific aspects of music by 
declaring them as legally relevant elements of protection. In this way the law turns the 
flow of music into certain static X-ray-like shadows of the breathing musical body to 
which the protection system of the law is able to attach.62  
This abstract discussion benefits from a concrete example as an illustration. 
When a piece of music is performed, one perceives a flow of sounds, one superseded 
by the other, but in correlation to one another in the listener’s mind, and incessantly 
sustained by the notion of a living force which is, together with the sounds 
themselves, an instance of the [p. 89] inner awareness of time.63 In contrast, copyright 
law splits apart performance and composition of the music. In relation to the 
composition the law freezes the compositional flow, itself a time-bound phenomenon, 
which runs through many stages and drafts, into one final version. In order to be a 
final version recognised by the law, this version must be recorded or fixed as a 
‘musical work’ (being a technical term of copyright law) with boundaries separating 
the discrete work from the material of musical inventiveness (or ‘intellectual 
commons’64) available to any composer. The requirement of recording or fixation, a 
characteristic feature of copyright law systems,65 emphasises the removal of the 
variability of the piece under the influence of time:66 notionally, time is taken out and 
the music is fixed as an immutable and precisely determinable musical object, the 
‘musical work’.67 The performance of the musical composition is a separate act (and 
separately protected in law) which animates the musical work, but does not make it in 
law the object of copyright protection: the object of protection is already the written 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See also Rahmatian (2005: 273, 281, 285). 
63 See above the discussion of Husserl’s concept of the phenomenology of the inner awareness of time, 
Husserl, Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (2000: 25-27, 63, 99, 101). 
64 See Rahmatian (2011: 111-113) for the specific meaning of the term ‘intellectual commons’ here: it 
denotes the reservoir of intellectual material and contribution of collective human creations (for the 
purpose of the law these are ex nihilo creations, because the term intellectual commons is as much a 
normative creation as its counterpart, intellectual property). I call ‘intellectual commons’ all intellectual 
material, whether protected by copyright or not, and ‘public domain’ intellectual material that is no 
longer, or has never been, in copyright. So ‘public domain’ is a subset of ‘intellectual commons’. 
65 For the UK, see Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA 1988), s. 3 (2). 
66 Similar also Adorno, Vers une musique informelle (2003a: 516-517): ‘The graphical-spatial system 
of signs locks the successive into simultaneity, into the static.’ 
67 In the UK, CDPA 1988, s. 3 (1), partial definition of ‘musical work’. See also Rahmatian (2009: 
566-569) for the meaning of ‘musical work’ in law, and below under 3. 
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piece recorded in a score or recorded on a sound recording as a past musical event: 
time and the necessary volatility and imprecision which time entails have been 
removed. By way of this reconceptualisation of the law, the music can become a static 
‘musical work’ and ‘propertisation’ (i.e. the turning of the music into an object of 
property68), or, from a socio-economic [p. 90] perspective, commodification can 
become possible.69 The music, a temporal structure, is depicted, and at the same time 
replaced, by a ‘musical work’ in law, which is recognised as an object of property 
(musical copyright). That is not a temporal structure, but a structure in time: for 
example, copyright in the musical work in question expires seventy years after the 
end of the year of the composer’s death70 – being subject(ed) to time, but not an 
intrinsic part of it, unlike the living art of music in reality.  
During the time of protection the musical work is a static entity in the eyes of 
the law. It is interesting to note that microeconomic market analysis, which is the 
basis for the widespread law-and-economics approach to law, also eliminates the 
element of time and turns the continuum of market forces into artificially frozen and 
timeless event-points,71 for example where supply and demand are supposed to meet 
in a market equilibrium72 with no consideration of the time-related processes before 
and after. The omnipresent obsession in business with risk management (e.g. through 
the derivatives trade) in the structuring of financial investments73 is, besides a certain 
narcissistic disposition of man, 74  ultimately the symptom of an inability to 
acknowledge the reality of time and the unpredictability of the future which the time-
process necessitates. In this context, music appears as an unintentionally subversive 
art form. [p. 91] 
Where the composer produces several drafts during the composition process 
until she declares one of the versions as final, copyright law follows the time-bound 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 A detailed discussion of the ‘propertisation’ process by copyright law in Rahmatian (2011: 35-43). 
The word ‘propertisation’ is unappealing but a useful shorthand reference for this conceptual process. 
Incidentally, the verb ‘to property’, though with the different meaning ‘to appropriate’, existed in the 
English language until the early seventeenth century, see the relevant entry in the Oxford English 
Dictionary. 
69 On the criticism of art as a commodity by Adorno (and Marx) in Hamilton (2007: 166-167).  
70  In the EU provided by the Term Directive, Directive 2005/116/EC (amended by Directive 
2011/77/EU), Art 1(1), referring to Art 2(1) of the Berne Convention which includes musical works in 
the definition of ‘literary and artistic works’. 
71 Hence for any Law-and-Economics analysis the Classical School of economics with its emphasis on 
long-term analysis (that is: time) would be a better starting point than the Neo-classical School of 
economics which effectively eliminates the time factor, see Rahmatian (2013a: 225-226). 
72 E.g. Mankiw (2012: 77). 
73 See e.g. Hudson (2013: 24-27, 1175-1176). 
74 This comprises especially the belief in the immortality of the Ego and the fear of death as not only a 
likely but a certain event, and, by extension, the fear of risk and the fear of loss of property/money as a 
narcissistic object-love, see the starting point of this analysis, Freud’s article On Narcissism of 1914, 
Freud (1957: 91) et passim. 
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creative process and postulates each draft as a copyright-protected musical work in its 
own right.75 Thus the law creates (potentially infinite76) notional stills of a ‘film’, 
similar to the way in which mathematicians conceptualise motion through calculus.77 
So time and temporal structures, such as music, act in an ‘analogous’, continuous 
way, while the law, assuming discrete points, has a ‘digital’ approach of essentially 
durationless instants. This is reminiscent of the philosophical paradox in antiquity 
when the Presocratic philosopher Zeno claimed that a flying arrow is in fact at rest 
because (at least in Aristotle’s controversial interpretation of Zeno’s paradox78) a time 
period is the sum of indivisible moments with no temporal magnitude. The argument 
behind this is that, since anything that is occupying a space just in its own size is at 
rest, the arrow is at rest in each single moment of flight.79 
 
 
2 The architecture and building blocks of music 
Ephemeral, ineffable and enigmatic as music may be, it nevertheless rests on the firm 
physical foundation of acoustics, and, in connection, mathematical principles of  
proportion.80 The correlation between mathematical proportion and music – ‘How 
sour sweet music is, when time is broke, and no proportion kept!’81 – has a long 
history. The connection between music and proportion exists at least since the 
Pythagorean School.82 This harmonia (i.e. coherent or harmonious relationship) as a 
[p. 92] principle of order was also considered to be the basis of the movement of the 
heavenly bodies in a music of the spheres.83 Two thousand years later Kepler had the 
same Pythagorean conviction that the planets from the centre of their orbits follow a 
‘harmonious’ mathematical law which he sought to ascertain in his research:84 in this 
context he discovered what is now called Kepler’s third law of planetary motion.85 
Proportion is also the link between music and architecture,86 and between music and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Sweeney v. Macmillan Publishers Ltd. [2002] R.P.C. 651 at 666. See also Rahmatian (2005: 283). 
76 Potentially infinite, because the normative border between one ‘still’ and the next one is determined 
by copyright-originality, also a normative term, see below, under 4. To separate one ‘still’ from 
another, the new one must be sufficiently ‘original’ in the copyright sense, and thereby distinguishable. 
77 Devlin (2000: 96, 100-101). 
78 See Lear (1981: 93-98), discussing the probably erroneous interpretation of Zeno’s argument by 
Aristotle. 
79 Aristotle regards this premise as false, see Aristotle, Physics, book 6, ch. 8, at 239b. 
80 See also Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, book 2, § 51 (Kant 1974: 263) [A210/B212-213]. 
81 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act 5, Scene 4. 
82 Hamilton (2007: 19-24). 
83 Toulmin and Goodfield (1968: 79-81). 
84 Kepler, Harmonies of the World, book 5 (2002: 652) et seq. 
85 Kepler’s third law of planetary motion means that the cubes of mean distances of the planets from 
the sun are proportional to the squares of their periods of revolution. 
86 Padovan (1999: 215) with reference to Leonardo Da Vinci, and Padovan (1999: 267) in relation to 
early eighteenth century architectural theory. 
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painting.87 The importance of mathematical proportion in music often leads to the 
inadequate characterisation that music and mathematics are necessarily connected or 
music is ‘applied mathematics’. Not only musicians, also mathematicians reject this 
popular belief,88 but it is true that proportion and patterns (and the recognition of 
these) are the elements which draw music and mathematics together.89 
Acoustically the matter is straightforward: a plucked string will oscillate with 
its fundamental frequency and then gradually the wave nodes of the vibrating string 
develop: 1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4 and so on (that is, the proportions of parts of the string of 1:2, 
2:3, 3:4, 4:5 etc.), creating the harmonics in intervals of the octave, fifth, fourth, major 
third, major second and so on. So the major scale is literally ‘natural’,90 since it is 
based on natural intervals (but the construction of the scale as such with their order 
and selection is obviously a cultural phenomenon). But from then on everything is the 
product of craft, ingenuity and cultural tradition. We concentrate on Western classical 
music91 when we ascertain the elements of music now. [p. 93] 
The elements of music are particularly: tone (pitch and timbre), volume, 
rhythm, melody, harmony, counterpoint and form. The latter five components depend 
on the specific type of the composition and the historical period of the music and do 
not necessarily appear in any one musical piece. What is called here ‘elements’ or 
‘components’ is the subject-matter of music theory – here understood in the broad 
sense as the teaching of the appropriate craftsmanship of composition as well as the 
philosophical and scientific examination of music as an abstract structure. Modern 
music theory is usually defined more narrowly as dealing with the fashioning 
principles within musical realisation and comprehension.92 However, the physical 
foundations of music, such as tone and timbre and their perception are commonly 
examined separately in physics and psychology (acoustics and psychoacoustics). 
Pitch and timbre are acoustical phenomena, pitch being the frequency of a 
sound (e.g. 440 Hertz which is the tone A in today’s standard), timbre (sound-colour) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Da Vinci (2001: 37): ‘[M]usic, in its harmonic intervals, makes its suave melodies, which are 
composed from varied notes. … the harmonic proportionality of painting is composed simultaneously 
from various components …’ 
88 Gowers (2002: 130), Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch Schönen (1902: 107-110). 
89 Root-Bernstein (2001: 63, 65), Vaughn (2000: 149). 
90 Roederer (2008: 115-116) on the standing wave modes in a vibrating string. For wind instruments, 
see Roederer (2008: 135-137). 
91 For the purpose of further discussion of copyright protection of music that will also give sufficient 
insight into Western jazz and pop music. The following discussion is, however, of limited relevance to 
non-Western music. 
92 Music theory has been understood as being the philosophical examination of an abstract structure in 
Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (being musica theorica as opposed to the musica 
practica: composition manuals dealing with the craft of composing and music making), especially with 
regard to the connection between mathematical and musical proportion. As from the early nineteenth 
century, the theoretical-scientific or philosophical approach to music experienced a new upturn. See 
Dahlhaus, Musiktheorie (1988: 95-98). 
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being the result of the specific mixture of harmonic components in a (complex) tone. 
This mixture of harmonics is different for the recorder when compared to the piano, 
the human voice or the violin, and these specific mixtures give each instrument its 
characteristic timbre. A computer spectrograph will depict a typical image of the 
spectrum of partials for each instrument. Or, within different ranges of a single 
instrument, diverse mixtures of harmonics may appear which are responsible for a 
different timbre in each range. A good example is the clarinet: the near-absence of the 
even harmonics (2, 4, 6 etc.) in the low register gives a hollow sound, while the 
presence of all harmonics in the upper register leads to a sharp sound.  
What is called ‘volume’ in music (indicated as ‘piano, forte’ etc.) is a 
combination of acoustics (amplitude of the vibration), and the perception by the ear 
and processed by the brain (psychoacoustic phenomenon: intensity and loudness).93 
[p. 94] 
Rhythm can be defined as the temporal relation of each note to another as 
against the background of an arrangement of strong and weak beats (metre) in the 
flow of measured time. Its constituting elements are measured time and tensions 
between accented or strong and non-accented or weak beats: this makes the rhythmic 
accents as projected against the metre, syncopation (a special form of rhythmic accent 
whereby the accent is shifted from a strong to a weak beat) and so on.94 Rhythm is an 
organisational principle of sounds.95 Some methods of musical analysis stress the 
nature of rhythm as a pattern.96  
‘Melody’ is extraordinarily difficult to define. For present purposes it should 
suffice to say that melody is an organised sequence of sounds that are perceived as 
intrinsically connected. The smallest unit of a melody is (often) the motif.97 In the 
melody in particular music reveals itself as a temporal structure and as a phenomenon 
of the inner awareness of fashioned time.98 
In Western (‘art’) music the most complex building blocks or elements within 
music are often harmony and counterpoint (this is obviously entirely dependent on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Roederer (2008: 93-99), and the curves of equal loudness according to Fletcher and Munson, at 98. 
See also the ‘spatial’ definition of volume by Coker (1972: 45): ‘The volume of a chord refers not to its 
loudness … but rather to the measure of the chord’s bulk or the musical space occupied by the pitches.’ 
94 In fact the matter is more complex, and a generally agreed definition of rhythm probably does not 
exist. See Hamilton (2007: 127-136) with definitions based on the history of philosophical thought. See 
further e.g. Cooke (1973: 36), Rahmatian (2005: 269) with a musical example and further references.  
95 Scruton (1997: 22-23) with examples. 
96 Cook (1994: 76-77) on Leonard Meyer’s musical analysis method. 
97 On the construction of melodies out of motifs or without motifs from a musical analyst’s and 
composer’s perspective, see e.g. De la Motte (1993: 29-44). A not very clear definition of ‘melody’, 
but influential, by A. B. Marx, Die Lehre von der musikalischen Komposition, vol. 1 (1868: 26, 28): ‘a 
tonally and rhythmically organised line/series of sounds’. Overview of definitions of ‘melody’, ‘motif’, 
‘theme’ etc. in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Knaus and Scholz (1988: 17-19). 
98 See also Scruton (1997: 41) with reference to Husserl, and discussion above under 1. 
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musical culture, type of music and epoch). In this area the difficult and sophisticated 
aspects of the craft of music had to be learned by generations of composers to fulfil 
the standards of the art of their time, and this tradition continues to give these topics a 
particular weight in music education and musical analysis. The ‘musica practica’, the 
practical craft of music composition has here strongly shaped the ‘musica 
theoretica’.99 Harmony deals with the composition [p. 95] of chords and their relation 
to one another, that is, the accepted or acoustically and aesthetically desirable 
progression of chords. These chords are at least triads; the typical musical examples 
in harmony are however in four parts (soprano/alto/tenor/bass) which corresponds to 
the mixed chorus (as they developed in the seventeenth century). In harmony there are 
two viewpoints, that of a composer – how to compose in an artistically acceptable 
way, and that of an analyst or music theorist – how is a given piece of music 
harmonically structured. In practical reality harmony consists largely of rules that 
guide us in which way one achieves a musically satisfying harmonic progression, 
modulation (key change) and harmonisation of a melody. For instance, in ‘classical’ 
harmony octaves, parallel fifths and false relations100 must normally be avoided.101 
Another more complex rule which is a typical example of the ‘academic’ treatment of 
harmony is the following one: if the bass part consists of a scale movement of 1-2-3 
(e.g. c-d-e), it is to be harmonised with Ib-Vc-I (with a passing 6/4, the second 
inversion chord), or especially in a choral in the style of Bach, with I-viib-Ib.102 If Vc 
is used, the bass (being the 5th of the second inversion chord) must be doubled. 
Traditional harmony textbooks are full with such rules. It is not possible and not 
necessary to go into more detail in this context.103 
While harmony regards music vertically, being the simultaneous combination 
of sounds, counterpoint looks at music horizontally as the separate parts in their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Or musica theorica. For these terms and their meaning in the early 1500s, see also Nicola Listenius 
(1549), quoted in Goehr (1992: 116). 
100 On parallel octaves and fifths, see e.g. De la Motte (2009: 23) with a critical discussion of the usual 
justifications. See also nineteenth-century discussion by A. B. Marx (1868: 84, 86, 530, 534-535). A 
false relation is especially the situation that, for example, d appears in the bass part and d sharp in the 
alto part at the same time (or for some time at the same time), and so creates an augmented prime (so-
called chromatic false relation). Such rules depend much on the musical era one looks at. False 
relations have always been used as an expressive device. A good overview of false relations 
(‘Querstand’) in A. B. Marx (1868: 499-506). 
101 One sees in such examples the cultural context of these rules which are often also (rather arbitrarily) 
extracted from a particular epoch in Western history of music, e.g. the era of J. S. Bach. In modern 
popular music, for example, this rule has little relevance. 
102 I = tonic (first degree of the scale), root position of the chord (e.g. c-e-g), Ib = tonic, first inversion 
(e-g-c), Ic = tonic, second inversion (g-c-e), V = dominant (g-b-d) (fifth). I = major chord, i = minor 
chord, etc.  
103 Slightly more discussion in Rahmatian (2005: 269-270). Books on harmony cannot be replaced by 
single examples and superficial paraphrasing in any case. For a concise description of harmony also for 
the non-musician, see e.g. Karolyi (1987: 60-84). 
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melodic development. Counterpoint is the art of [p. 96] setting one or more 
melodically and rhythmically independent parts (counterpoints) to a given melody 
(subject), whereby (in classical music) the rules of harmony have to be observed at 
the same time. Hence progressions of chords in harmony already have an intrinsic 
movement of the parts: two or more parts move (1) in the same direction (similar 
motion, motus rectus), (2) in different directions (contrary motion, motus contrarius), 
(3) one part moves up or down and the other does neither but stays (oblique motion, 
motus obliquus). In counterpoint, emphasis is on the line of each part, its horizontal 
melodic aspect and the melodic and rhythmical independence of the different parts, 
not on the harmonic combination of the sounds, which is (from this perspective) 
incidental.104 Fugues are a prominent example of this technique. Different musical 
epochs had different rules of counterpoint,105 but generally the most influential 
exposition of the rules of counterpoint is by the Austrian baroque composer Johann 
Joseph Fux (1660-1741) who distinguished five prototypes (‘species’) of 
counterpoint: (1) note against note, (2) two notes against one, (3) four notes against 
one, (4) two half notes/minims against a whole note/semibreve in form of a ligature 
(tie) or syncopation, (5) a combination of all species (contrapunctus floridus).106 
Historically, the relevance of Fux’s counterpoint textbook Gradus ad Parnassum is 
beyond doubt; indeed Haydn and Beethoven learned counterpoint with it. Whether it 
is pedagogically still satisfactory today, is less clear.107 Composition in technical 
counterpoint ceased before the end of the eighteenth century, except in church music, 
where it lasted much longer. However, modern classical composers are well familiar 
with this technique and use or allude to it.108 Pop music is more conservative in the 
use of harmony and counterpoint: whenever a harmonisation of a melody uses a 
contrary motion (and it typically does), that is a vestige of the old counterpoint. 
Again, this little outline must suffice here.109 [p. 97] 
What is ‘acceptable’ and what are established rules of harmony and 
counterpoint are aesthetic questions, by no means answered concordantly in various 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 The harmonic aspect of the counterpoint becomes, however, particularly important in the Bach era, 
see De la Motte (2010: 221-222). 
105 De la Motte (2010: 8). 
106 Fux (1971: 27, 41, 50, 55, 64). Fux’s textbook was intended to teach the craft of musical 
composition, not analytical music theory, see Cook (1994: 25). 
107 De la Motte (2010: 11). 
108 E.g. Whittall (2003: 133-134) (on Hans Werner Henze’s Requiem). See also Adorno, Die Funktion 
des Kontrapunkts in der neuen Musik (2003a: 145). 
109 Slightly more discussion of counterpoint (for copyright analysis) with an example in Rahmatian 
(2005: 270-271). Harmony and counterpoint can be the basis of large-scale analysis of whole musical 
pieces in some analytical techniques, such as the Schenkerian analysis method, see Cook (1994: 36): In 
Schenkerian analysis ‘a composition is seen as the large-scale embellishment of a simple underlying 
harmonic progression … the same analytical principles that apply to cadences in strict counterpoint can 
be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the large-scale harmonic structures of complete pieces.’ 
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textbooks, and in any case dependent on the historical basis from which examples of 
exercises of harmony and counterpoint are drawn.110 Both subjects are usually still 
taught in a somewhat ahistorical way, thus historically frozen sometime in the 
baroque and classical traditions of Western art music of around 1680-1820. In fact, 
the rules of harmony and counterpoint changed over the different ages, and modern 
texts on harmony and counterpoint take account of that.111 Harmony and counterpoint 
rules are distilled and sometimes dry ideal-typical musical grammar. These types exist 
in classical music (until about the beginning of the twentieth century) but are 
presented out of a larger musical context and rarely appear in simple purity in real 
musical pieces. They are nevertheless an indispensable exercise for analysis and 
compositional craftsmanship, but especially for the creative composer these are rules 
he/she has to master in order to be able to break them most effectively in the actual 
creative process. As will be shown, for the copyright lawyer the rules of harmony and 
counterpoint are a particularly important example of concepts, techniques, ‘ideas’.112 
Form is the last important element of music. It is also historically the latest, 
not because musical pieces did not correspond to certain forms (they did, but 
generally the forms were rather simple ones), but because it was only in the early 
nineteenth century that the interest in musical analysis and musical forms rose to a 
scientific level, partly under the influence of the aesthetics of Hegel and German 
Idealism. The composition teacher, analyst and aesthetician Adolf Bernhard Marx 
(1795-1866), following Hegel’s path, was here of great importance through his 
textbooks on composition and music theory.113 The subject of form in music discusses 
the organisation of whole musical pieces by using [p. 98] harmonic, melodic, 
rhythmic aspects to discover the overall architecture of a piece.114 For example, there 
is the binary form, ternary form, da capo form;115 the sonata form,116 the symphony, 
suite, dance (with many sub-categories), variation, the rondo form, concerto, toccata, 
canon, madrigal, mass and so on.117 The aspect of form is an essential starting point 
for musical analysis. Several types and schools of musical analysis exist.118 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See an instructive statistical example to show that the common rule that in case of root position and 
first inversion chords the root should be doubled and in the second place the fifth, but the third only 
sparingly, is incorrect for Bach and the baroque era, De la Motte (2009: 43-44). Here it becomes also 
apparent that it depends from which composer, which era or which style (Italian, French, German) the 
rule of harmony in question has been distilled. 
111 De la Motte (2009: 7-8), De la Motte (2010: 7). 
112 See below under 4. 
113 Cook (1994: 12-13), Dahlhaus (1983: 45). 
114 See e.g. Scruton (1997: 309-312).  
115 Knaus and Scholz (1988: 45-65). 
116 An example of a full analysis of pieces in sonata form in Cook (1994: 260) using some classical and 
early Romantic works. 
117 A. B. Marx, Die Lehre von der musikalischen Komposition, vol. 3 (1879: 12-13, and ix-xiv) 
distinguishes in particular between compositions for independent musical instruments and for vocal 
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The elements or building blocks of music are important for an analysis of the 
protection of music by copyright because these elements are indicators as to what can 
be protected by copyright in a work of music, and what cannot. This is especially 
achieved by the so-called idea-expression dichotomy.119 
 
 
3 The idea of the ‘musical work’ in the theory and history of music and its 
specific meaning in copyright law 
 
3.1 The theoretical-historical idea of the ‘musical work’ 
According to Goehr, music philosophy distinguishes four analytical theories of the 
musical work. First, the Platonist view: musical works are universals constituted by 
structures of sounds and exist everlastingly, long before any compositional activity 
and long after they may have been forgotten. In an Aristotelian view, musical works 
exist as performances and score-copies. According to the nominalist view, works of 
music have no form of abstract existence; performances are only classified because 
they stand in appropriate relations to one another and to score-copies, and [p. 99] this 
classification is only linguistic for the convenience to refer to certain classes of 
particulars. The fourth view is the idealist view of musical works (Croce, 
Collingwood): works are identified with ideas formed in the composer’s mind and are 
then expressed in an objectified form through score-copies or performances which 
make the works accessible to the public. The work is, however, the musical idea 
itself, not its objectified expression.120 Goehr then characterises the idea of the 
‘musical work’ as a regulative concept, not as a constitutive one: it indicates 
normatively what should be done in a given artistic genre, not what the fabric of the 
practice is. The ‘musical work’ is also an open concept, that is, unbounded, mutable, 
receptive to continuity, and able to undergo alterations in its definition without losing 
its identity as new examples come to appear as standard. This is in contrast to closed 
concepts which refer to their own particular internal, formal, structural or purposeful 
coherence, for example in justice or property.121 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
compositions, and within the former states as separate sub-species the piano etude, the piano fugue, the 
variation, the small rondo form, the large rondo form, the sonata form, and mixed forms, e.g. the 
sonata-like rondo, and within the latter category (vocal compositions) classifies into the recitativo, the 
lied (song), and choral compositions.  
118 Cook (1994: 27, 67, 116) on formal and psychological approaches to analysis, Schenkerian analysis 
and so on. 
119 See below under 4. 
120 Goehr (1992: 14-19). 
121 Goehr (1992: 93-94, 102-103). 
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From that Goehr proceeds to a controversial historical claim: the regulative 
concept ‘musical work’ emerged only around 1800; before that time composers did 
not really have the understanding of what we call ‘musical work’ today as a result of 
nineteenth century Romantic aesthetics. Therefore Baroque composers like Bach did 
not intend to compose musical works, but were, and saw themselves as, craftsmen.122 
This view has been criticised by several authors. It has been said that Goehr’s 
argument is based on an overstated idea that the concept of music as a fine art 
emerged under the duress of the romantic cult of personality in the early nineteenth 
century. But one can see from the sources, without being in danger of an 
anachronistic reinterpretation, that Baroque composers like Bach or Fux considered 
their productions as autonomous works of art,123 and the same can also be claimed for 
the seventeenth century and even earlier periods.124 Critics also pointed out that the 
emergence of the idea of the ‘work-concept’ around 1800 and its dominance from 
then onwards has to be sought not in the means of production or performance but in 
the way music was experienced by the audience.125 In this debate the real question is 
probably (to revert to the [p. 100] four different analytical views of musical works 
outlined before) ‘whether the interaction between ideas held about music and the 
various musical objects or events at hand together generated the various notions of the 
musical work’.126 
This argument of a ‘Romantic’ shift of the understanding of the ‘musical 
work’ around 1800 is also relevant to copyright law, because the issue of the 
interpretation or emergence of the concept of the musical work is intertwined with the 
issue of authorship.127 In the discourse on copyright history the argument of the 
emergence of the concept of the ‘Romantic’ author which is claimed to have appeared 
sometime in the late eighteenth century and which is seemingly responsible for the 
shaping of the modern copyright laws and their authorship/ownership rules, is well-
known. Both the ‘Romantic’ author debate among copyright scholars, initiated mostly 
by Woodmansee and Jaszi,128 and Goehr’s interpretation of the historical development 
of the concept of the musical work have common ancestors, particularly Barthes’s and 
Foucault’s ‘death of the author’ idea,129 although it must be stressed that neither 
Barthes and Foucault nor copyright scholars elaborating on the latters’ authorship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Goehr (1992: 8, 111-115). See also critical discussion of Goehr’s claim by Barron (2006: 41-42). 
123 White (1997: 97, 101-102) with the examples of passages from Fux’s Gradus ad Parnassum, and 
Bach’s Musical Offering. 
124 Butt (2005: 30). 
125 Erauw (1998: 112). 
126 Butt (2005: 38). 
127 Butt (2005: 40, 47-48). 
128 Especially in Woodmansee (1984: 425), Jaszi (1991: 455). 
129 Barthes (1979: 145), Foucault (1991: 101). 
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concepts devote any discussion to music.130 I have criticised elsewhere at length131 the 
highly speculative and unsatisfactory critique of the concept of the ‘Romantic author’ 
in copyright scholarship that supposedly governs copyright law principles, is 
allegedly responsible for a false understanding of authorship in the modern (Internet) 
world and purportedly hinders the recognition of work collaborations by copyright 
law. So there is no need to repeat that discussion here. The real effect of the 
‘Romantic author’ critique of a ‘traditional’ understanding of authorship is ultimately 
a rejection of any individual creativity and authorship, hence the individual artist (or 
group of collaborating artists) need not be able to claim copyright protection. This is 
precisely in line with the interests of large entertainment enterprises, which normally 
hold copyright ownership in individual [p. 101] authors’ works anyway, either by 
way of assignment or through employee’s copyright rules, particularly in the music 
industry.132 In this way, a neo-liberal justification in the appearance of a sophisticated 
or even subversive critique has been provided, a typical feature of postmodernist 
theories.133  
 
3.2 The meaning of the ‘musical work’ in copyright law, and the relevance of 
‘recording’ 
Following Goehr’s definition,134 one could be tempted to say that the open concept of 
the ‘musical work’ in music theory is turned into a closed concept of ‘musical work’ 
by copyright law since the law transforms the musical work into an object of property. 
But matters are not quite that simple. In copyright law, a musical work is not 
conclusively defined, and it would probably have a sclerotic effect if it were. In UK 
law a ‘musical work’ is ‘a work consisting of music’, exclusive of words and dance 
(‘action’) intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music.135 That limitation 
only denotes that words and dance136 are in categories different from ‘musical work’ 
(literary work, dramatic work), but does not define ‘musical work’ further, so this is 
also an ‘open concept’. However, the ‘category approach’ of copyright systems 
requires the creation in question to fall into one of the provided legal categories 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Rahmatian (2011: 157). Barthes does, however, talk about music in Musica Practica, see Barthes 
(1979: 149) – how illuminating that is, must be decided by the reader (an approach that would possibly 
obtain Barthes’s agreement). 
131 Rahmatian (2011: 149-182). 
132 Rahmatian (2011: 177-180). 
133 See, generally in relation to postmodernism, and particularly in relation to Foucault, Mandosio 
(2010: 70-74). 
134 Goehr (1992: 93-94, 102-103). 
135 CDPA 1988, s. 3 (1).  
136 Dance is covered superficially only in the legal literature on copyright. This may be the case 
because the dance community is rather reluctant about asserting rights, and there is as yet no case law 
on dance, see Waelde, Whatley and Pavis (2014: 218, 224). 
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(literary work, dramatic work, musical work, artistic work etc.) as a first prerequisite 
for protection.137 Continental European author’s rights systems do not have a category 
approach; their list of work categories is open-ended, but here the differences between 
the two protection philosophies are in effect not very significant.138 The legal meaning 
of ‘musical work’ probably comes closest to a nominalist view of [p. 102] the 
‘musical work’ in music theory, with elements of an idealist understanding.139  
A musical work in copyright law does not coincide with a work of music in 
music theory.140 An illustrative case on this point was Sawkins v. Hyperion.141 The 
musicologist Sawkins prepared a performing edition of some works of the French 
Baroque composer Michel-Richard de Lalande (1657-1726). He gathered surviving 
manuscripts and prints scattered in various libraries world-wide, selected the most 
appropriate version, produced a score and a series of parts which would make the 
works (grand motets) playable. He also inserted or re-composed missing material, 
added transcriptions and a figuring to the bass line or a figured bass altogether, all in 
all 3,000 editorial interventions.142 The defendant, a record company which refused to 
pay Sawkins a royalty or performance fee and was subsequently sued for copyright 
infringement, claimed, among other things, that Sawkins’s editorial interventions did 
not form part of the music and so he did not create an original musical work which 
would warrant copyright protection (Lalande’s music itself was undisputedly in the 
public domain).143 Leaving aside the separate issue of originality in copyright for 
now, 144 the question was whether the restoration by the musicologist to make 
Lalande’s works of Baroque music performable again amounts to a ‘musical work’ in 
the sense of copyright. It does, in the opinion of both the High Court145 and the Court 
of Appeal,146 which shows that the legal/normative category of musical work does not 
correspond entirely to what composers, musicians and listeners would normally 
regard as ‘music’; for them this would be Lalande’s music, restored.147 In fact, 
Sawkins attempted not to give the impression that he did anything which was not in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 CDPA 1988, ss. 1 (1) and (2), 3 (1). Time will tell whether this remains the case, see a qualifying 
statement in relation to the UK category approach in SAS Institute v. World Programming [2013] 
EWHC 69, para. 27. See also chapter 2 by Charlotte Waelde. 
138 Rahmatian (2011: 53) with further references to French and German law. 
139 See Goehr (1992: 14-19, 93-94, 102-103) and above on this point. 
140 See also on this point, Barron (2006: 43-45). 
141 Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 565, [2005] RPC 32 (Court of Appeal); 
[2004] EWHC 1530 (Ch), 2005 RPC 4 (High Court). 
142 An extended discussion of this case by Rahmatian (2009: 560-591) that also takes account of the far 
more detailed facts. 
143 Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 565, paras. 24, 42. 
144 See below under 4. 
145 Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2004] EWHC 1530 (Ch), paras. 54, 58. 
146 Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 565, paras. 36, 43, 45, 49-40.  
147 Rahmatian (2009: 566). 
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the spirit of Lalande’s work, since a restorer must subject his own artistic intentions to 
those of [p. 103] the artist whose work is to be restored.148 So the restorative 
performing edition prepared by the musicologist is no new music independent from 
Lalande’s (e.g. a variation of it or work inspired by it), which would be considered as 
a ‘musical work’ in music theory. When the case was decided, music circles were 
rather upset, probably because they wrongly assumed that this decision would draw 
public domain works back into copyright. However, the musical work for which 
Sawkins could claim copyright is only the narrow area besides the music by Lalande 
that constitutes his own editorial input.149 Everybody is free to create his/her own 
performing edition on the basis of the existing manuscripts.150 This highlights the 
normative/nominalist aspect of the concept of ‘musical work’ in copyright law.  
However, there is also an idealist aspect to the legal concept ‘musical work’. 
Music is the sound, not the score for the purpose of copyright protection. Case law is 
unequivocal here: the impact on the ear is more important than the notes written 
down.151 Infringement cannot be determined by a note-for-note comparison of the 
claimant’s and the defendant’s work; the notes are essential, but not the sole 
determinants of what is heard.152 Reproduction of a musical work only occurs (and 
infringement if a substantial part was reproduced) when the substance of [p. 104] the 
original copyright work is taken, not only when identity is achieved.153 ‘Music must 
be distinguished from the fact and form of its fixation as a record of a musical 
composition. … But the fixation in the written score or on a record is not in itself the 
music in which copyright subsists.’154 Nevertheless, the copyright system of the UK 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 See also Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 565, paras. 80, 82 where the court 
likened Sawkins’s work to that of a picture restorer. 
149 In copyright law the theoretical rule is clear, and those who raised concerns (also lawyers) in 
relation to this decision did not seem to have had sufficient understanding of music and/or of UK 
copyright law, but it is obvious that the application of this principle can cause great problems, because 
restorations of something that is no longer there in the original or restorations where there may be 
several options are in reality difficult to separate from the original work (here Baroque music) that is in 
the public domain. 
150 Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 565, para. 86: ‘… the sort of work done by Dr 
Sawkins should be encouraged. It saves others the time and trouble of re-creation of near-lost works, 
but in no sense creates a monopoly in them. If someone wants to use Dr Sawkins’s short cut, they need 
his permission.’ (emphasis added). See also Rahmatian (2009: 585-586, 590). 
151 Austin v. Columbia Graphophone Co [1917-23] Macg. Cop. Cas. 398: In that case the defendants 
had deliberately harmonised the plaintiff’s material in the same manner as the plaintiff had done, 
although they had not taken the actual notes used by the plaintiff. By using the plaintiff’s methods of 
harmonisation they had imitated the plaintiff’s work and captured the impression the plaintiff’s work 
created and on which the commercial success was based. Hence there was infringement of copyright. 
This case was referred to approvingly in Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2004] EWHC 1530 (Ch), 
para. 57. 
152 Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2004] EWHC 1530 (Ch), para. 57. 
153 Francis Day & Hunter v. Bron [1963] 1 Ch 587, at 611-612, also with reference to Austin v. 
Columbia Graphophone Co [1917-23] Macg. Cop. Cas. 398. 
154 Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 565, para. 53. 
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requires fixation or recording of a musical work as a prerequisite of protection.155 
Continental European authors’ rights countries do not have such a fixation 
requirement, so, for example, a piano improvisation is protected by author’s right 
even if not recorded at all. However, there may well be problems of evidence in an 
infringement action, so that in effect the situation may not be much different from the 
UK.156 But the dualism – (1) the protected music is the perceived sounds, and (2) the 
score is the reified evidence of the composed musical work157 – has features of an 
idealist interpretation of the ‘musical work’ in the philosophy of music. While the 
music may first exist as an idea, it must obtain objectified expression through a score 
or in a performance,158 whereby the performance, being ephemeral, must itself be 
fixed, for example on a sound recording (which attracts copyright protection in its 
own right, separate from the recorded music). Imprecise and shadowy as the score is 
to depict the music as it is to be performed, the law uses this reification as a shorthand 
reference to the musical work to attach copyright protection and to turn it into a 
‘definite’ and durationless property object. 
Copyright law was not always so sure about this. In an old case159 the idea that 
music is the sound, not the score, was taken to its logical conclusion. Music appeals to 
the ear, while a sheet of music appeals to the eye, hence the performance of the sheet 
music (in this case by means of a perforated piano roll160) was held not to be 
infringement of the [p. 105] copyright in the music. Today this would unquestionably 
be copyright infringement.161  
It follows from the present law about musical copyright that any change in the 
score, for example through an editorial intervention, which has an impact on the 
acoustical event of the performed music itself (‘the totality of the sounds produced by 
the musicians’162), is potentially a candidate for copyright protection. There will 
indeed be copyright protection if that intervention or change is also considered as 
‘original’ in the specific meaning of copyright law.163 The criterion of originality in 
copyright law will be discussed now. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 CDPA 1988, s. 3 (2). 
156 Rahmatian (2011: 54-55) with further references in relation to French and German law. 
157 Rahmatian (2009: 568). 
158 See Goehr (1992: 18). 
159 Boosey v. Whight [1900] 1 Ch. 122 (CA). 
160 The piano roll was not considered as a reproduction of the notes in the sheet music, and was 
therefore held as not infringing copying of the music, Boosey v. Whight [1900] 1 Ch. 122, at 124. 
161 CDPA 1988, s. 17 (2). 
162 This is the expression used by the court in Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 
565, para. 49. 
163 That is what Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 565, decided with regard to 
scholarly editions of music, see especially para. 49. See also for more detail, Rahmatian (2009: 568-
569). 
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4 The conceptualisation of ‘original’ music by copyright law and its 
protectable elements 
 
4.1 The meaning of ‘originality’ in copyright in relation to works of music 
The requirements for copyright protection of music are that the creation must be a 
‘musical work’, that the musical work must be recorded,164 and that it must be 
‘original’ in the meaning of copyright law.165 The traditional British approach to 
originality was that the music must be the result of the author’s own skill, labour, 
effort and judgement, expense and so on.166 Effectively the originality requirement 
acts as a protection of the author against a short-cut or free ride by somebody else, 
who has not exercised the author’s skill and effort. So he does not have the expenses 
and take the commercial risk and seeks to take over the author’s product at a fraction 
of the cost. Originality in copyright law means, ‘not deriving from elsewhere, not 
being copied’; it does not [p. 106] mean ‘creative’ or ‘artistic’.167 On this basis, 
Sawkins’s editorial efforts were accepted as being ‘original’ for the purpose of 
copyright protection168 in Sawkins v. Hyperion, still the latest principal English case 
on the subsistence of copyright in musical works. The court specifically pointed out 
that copyright protection prevents a competitor from making a short-cut.169  
In the light of recent CJEU/ECJ judgments on the originality criteria in 
copyright,170 the classical UK definition of originality may well have to be qualified. 
To what extent, is however controversial. According to some views, the CJEU 
decisions arguably have not changed substantially the originality principles in UK 
copyright law,171 while others detect a sea change.172 In any case, greater emphasis 
will have to be placed on ‘judgement’ and ‘choice’ when assessing originality in UK 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 For work and recording/fixation, see above under 3. 
165 CDPA 1988, s. 1 (1) and (2). 
166 The classical decisions are University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch. 
601, at 610, Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. [1964] 1 WLR 273. 
167 See Rahmatian (2011: 38-41, 52-56), discussing specifically the unfair competition aspect of UK 
copyright protection, and contrasting it with the author’s rights approach which insists on a ‘personal 
intellectual creation’ or ‘the work bearing the stamp of the author’ for originality and protection.  
168 And they were considered as ‘musical works’ in the first place, see discussion above under 3. 
169 Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 565, para. 86. See also Griffiths (2013: 774-
775). 
170 Especially the cases Infopaq International v. Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECDR 16 (Case 
C-5/08); Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace v. Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2011] 
FSR 18 (Case C-393/09); Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH, Axel Springer AG, Süddeutsche Zeitung 
GmbH, Spiegel-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co. KG, Verlag M. DuMont Schauberg Expedition 
der Kölnischen Zeitung GmbH & Co KG [2012] ECDR 6 (C-145/10); Football Dataco Ltd and others 
v. Yahoo! UK Ltd and others, 1 March 2012 (Case C-604/10), [2012] ECDR 10. 
171 Rahmatian (2013b: 4) for a discussion why effectively the traditional originality criteria of UK 
copyright will only need slight adjustment following recent CJEU cases. 
172 E.g. Rosati (2013: 47), Griffiths (2013: 780-783). 
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law to give effect to the CJEU requirements: the composer/author must apply his/her 
judgement to make selections and choices when he/she creates the work, and through 
these choices the author expresses original creative ability and thus stamps his/her 
personal touch on the work. That would reflect the originality test of ‘own intellectual 
creation’ in several EU Directives on aspects of copyright173 in the interpretation of 
the CJEU.174 [p. 107] Whether this ‘new’ test moves UK originality closer to the 
Continental European author’s rights concepts of originality, is however most 
doubtful,175 and the decision of Sawkins v. Hyperion shows that. This case has been 
decided in England and in France on substantially the same facts,176 and in both 
countries the courts gave the musicologist Sawkins copyright/author’s rights 
protection in relation to his performing edition. While the English court could rely on 
its classical ‘skill and labour’ originality doctrine, and the principle that copyright 
protection seeks to prevent making a short cut,177 the French court, delivering its 
judgment a few months earlier, stressed that originality is a relative concept and found 
no difficulty in attesting the restorer a personal contribution that amounts to genuine 
creative work. In this way the French court reconciled its decision with the 
theoretically different originality requirement in French author’s rights law. In French 
author’s rights law a work is original if it has the mark of intellectual contribution. 
The element of personal choice played a role in the assessment of the originality of 
the intellectual contribution,178 here the preparation of a performing edition. 
A composer going about the composing of music in a ‘traditional’ matter, that 
is, writing a score (probably irrespective of which kind of notation is used), or 
recording sound patterns in a broad sense, will almost always fulfil the originality 
requirement for copyright protection, whichever originality test is applied. However, 
the law struggles in situations of contributions and joint authorship, for example 
where different band members are involved. Here it shows that the law has [p. 108] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Directive 96/9/EC (Database Directive) Art. 3 (1); Directive 2009/24/EC (Software Directive), Art. 
1(3); Directive 2001/29/EC (Information Society Directive), Art. 2 (a) (reproduction right); Directive 
2006/116/EC (Term Directive), Art. 6 and Recital 16. 
174 See particularly Infopaq International v. Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECDR 16 (Case C-
5/08), para. 45; Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH and others [2012] ECDR 6 (C-145/10), para. 94; 
Football Dataco Ltd and others v. Yahoo! UK Ltd and others, 1 March 2012 (Case C-604/10), [2012] 
ECDR 10, para. 38. 
175 See Rahmatian (2013b: 21-22, 24-27). 
176 Sawkins v. Harmonia Mundi, TGI Nanterre, 1re ch. 19 Janv. 2005: RIDA 1/2006, p. 391. See also, 
‘Case Comment: Sawkins v. Harmonia Mundi’ (2006: 118-119). 
177 Sawkins v. Hyperion [2005] EWCA Civ 565, paras. 36, 42, 86. 
178 Sawkins v. Harmonia Mundi, n. 172 above, 19 Jan. 2005, pp. 4-5: ‘une œuvre de l’esprit doit porter 
la marque de l’apport intellectuel et personnel de l’auteur, peu important son degré d’originalité … [le 
demandeur] a dû procéder à des choix artistiques personnels et arbitraires à partir de son 
interprétation personnelle des œuvres … l’originalité étant relative, il importe peu que les apports 
soient disséminés …’ (my emphasis). 
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difficulties with the fundamentally performative element in music. 179  The 
phenomenon of the composer-performer/improvising composer is evidently not a new 
one – Mozart and Beethoven were among the most celebrated composer-performers 
of their time.180 In jazz and pop music one is frequently confronted with that issue 
today. The courts rightly distinguish between the composition and the performance,181 
in line with the copyright statute,182 but it becomes a problem to decide when a 
performance departs so considerably from the composition that it can be regarded as a 
new, independent musical work. In pop music in particular, a fixed written score that 
conclusively notes down the composition is uncommon.183 The typical court cases 
concern a musical contribution of one band member (a solo, a drum rhythm) which 
has an effect on the overall acoustic impression of the performed piece. One case said 
that a contribution must be ‘to the creation of the musical works, not to the 
performance or interpretation of them’ and must ‘possess significant creative 
originality’ 184  to be considered as original (and co-authorship/co-ownership be 
awarded with an entitlement to a share in the royalties). A joint author/co-composer 
needs to provide ‘a significant creative input’ that ‘finds its way into the finished 
work.’185 So the band member must qualify as a co-composer, not just as a co-
performer, even if the composition is the result of improvisatory takes and versions of 
all performers through which the work is gradually shaped over a period of time. To 
arrive at a distinction, the improvisation must tip over into a mere performance, the 
improvisation must have stopped, the composition completed, and the acoustical 
rendering must have become merely [p. 109] performance of the musical work – an 
artificial categorisation. Here we have again the problem of the law with temporal 
structures, movements, developments.186 But there are also problems with distinctions 
as to modality. Is the contribution of a drummer to songs of a pop group part of the 
musical work (so it may attract copyright protection in form of co-authorship/co-
ownership), or only performance? Or is it only the player of a melody instrument who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 See on co-authorship/co-ownership in music the extensive discussion in chapter 6 by Alison Firth. 
See also discussion above under 1. 
180 Obviously one has to distinguish between the composer-performer who composes first and then 
performs the composition himself, and the composer who composes by means of performance and 
improvisation. What Mozart really was (since he seemed to have composed everything in his head 
anyway) is not so easy to decide, but that was before the copyright era in the Habsburg countries. 
181  Hadley v. Kemp [1999] EMLR 589. Case comment by Arnold (1999: 464); Coffey v. 
Warner/Chappell Music [2005] EWHC 449 (Ch). See also McDonagh (2012: 69-70). 
182 Copyright protection of the composition (musical work): CDPA 1988, ss. 1 (1) (a) and 3 (1); 
performance (separate rights in performances by the performer, whether this is also the composer or 
not): CDPA 1988, s. 180 (1) (a). 
183 However, that was unusually the case in Hadley v. Kemp [1999] EMLR 589.  
184 Hadley v. Kemp [1999] EMLR 589, 643-644, 648. 
185 Robin Ray v. Classic FM [1998] FSR 622, 636. 
186 See above under 1. 
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would be able to qualify, or the singer? It may depend on each band who writes, or 
co-writes, the songs (‘writing’ is here understood as encompassing any process of 
creation), but a drummer can qualify in the view of the courts, at least ‘a good 
drummer’ as he ‘can significantly influence the whole composition’. 187  The 
drummer’s contribution was here part of the composition as performed, not of the 
performance only.  
The cases on joint authorship with regard to musical works display a certain 
anomaly. To qualify for a share in the copyright the claimant must show that he 
significantly participated in the creation of the musical composition pursuant to a 
common design,188 and his contribution must also be ‘original’ in the copyright sense, 
whereby originality is here understood, exceptionally, as demonstrating some artistic 
ability or creativity.189 However, neither in the copyright systems, nor in the author’s 
rights countries ‘originality’ requires artistic creativity,190 and that also applies to the 
possibly new interpretation of originality by the CJEU: ‘own intellectual creation’ 
denotes ‘choice’ which enables a certain authorial individuality to be reflected in the 
work; artistic ability, or artistic creativity is irrelevant.191 Another example of a 
certain inclination towards artistic creativity in assessing originality in cases of jointly 
composed musical works is Fisher v. Brooker.192 At issue was, [p. 110] among other 
things, the eight-bar organ solo played by the band member of Procol Harum, 
Matthew Fisher, on the Hammond organ at the beginning of the song ‘A Whiter 
Shade of Pale’ (1967). The defendant, Gary Brooker, claimed that Fisher’s organ solo 
was only an arrangement of an earlier version of the song by the defendant for voice 
and piano. However, evidence showed that Mr Fisher was at most building upon 
‘ideas’ used in the course of rehearsal, but was not copying Mr Brooker’s piano 
version. The judge decided that the claimant’s organ solo introduction was 
sufficiently different from what the defendant had composed earlier on the piano to 
qualify in law, ‘and by a wide margin, as an original contribution to the work.’ Fisher 
therefore shared the ownership of the musical copyright in the song as a joint 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Stuart v. Barrett [1994] EMLR 448, at 460. In that case the court awarded the drummer a share in 
the copyright of the songs in question. 
188 Stuart v. Barrett [1994] EMLR 448, at 460, following Cala Homes (South) Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine 
Homes East Ltd. (No. 1) [1995] FSR 818. 
189 Hadley v. Kemp [1999] EMLR 589, 643-644, 648, Stuart v. Barrett [1994] EMLR 448, at 460. Less 
specific in Brighton v. Jones [2005] FSR 288 (the case concerned a theatre play, a dramatic work). 
190 See Rahmatian (2011: 54-58, 191-193) for a longer discussion of this complex issue in copyright 
law. The problem is here that there is now a proliferation of the use of the word ‘creativity’ well 
beyond the artistic sector which makes clear distinctions difficult.  
191 See discussion above. 
192 Fisher v. Brooker [2006] EWHC 3239 (Ch), [2007] FSR 12, at 255. The Court of Appeal decision 
of Brooker v. Fisher [2008] EWCA Civ 287, and the House of Lords decision of Fisher v. Brooker 
[2009] UKHL 41, 1 WLR 1764, did not reverse or specifically discuss the points relevant here and are 
therefore disregarded. 
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author.193 This case also indicates a bias towards ‘artistic creativity’ as a requirement 
to find for originality. Not only the reference to an original contribution ‘by a wide 
margin’ suggests this, but also the judge’s consideration as to whether the claimant 
were entitled to a share in the copyright if his only contribution to the work had been 
the organ accompaniment to the sung parts.194 All that wrangles in the question ‘what 
is (good) art (or music)?’ which is normally carefully avoided when the subsistence of 
copyright is ascertained,195 and rightly so, because it is not the courts’ business to 
decide that.  
Incidentally, in Fisher v. Brooker it was undisputed that the eight-bar organ 
solo at issue was inspired by J. S. Bach’s second movement of the Third Orchestral 
Suite in D major (BWV 1068, ‘Air on a G String’) and a second work by Bach, the 
cantata ‘Wachet auf, ruft uns die Stimme’ (BWV 140).196 The claimant’s piece was 
sufficiently independent from its models to attract protection in its own right, but the 
question of ‘inspiration’ touches on the problem of the idea-expression dichotomy. 
[p. 111] 
 
4.2 The concept of the ‘idea-expression dichotomy’ in copyright law and its 
application to works of music 
The principle in copyright law is that ideas (concepts, methods, techniques) are not 
protected by copyright, while expressions (the application of ideas as they specifically 
manifest themselves in the concrete produced work) are.197 This so-called rule of the 
idea-expression dichotomy is not uncontroversial.198 However, despite its ambiguities 
it is a generally helpful rule for delineating and limiting the extent of the property 
protection copyright confers,199 particularly with regard to music.200 The ‘elements’ or 
‘building blocks’ of music outlined above201 are what lawyers would call ‘ideas’ in 
copyright law: rhythm, melody, harmony, counterpoint, form, methods of 
instrumentation in arrangements, and their rules and principles. The problem usually 
arises in copyright infringement cases because of non-literal copying of a pre-existing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Fisher v. Brooker [2007] FSR 12, paras. 40, 42. See McDonagh (2012: 64) for a case comment. 
194 Fisher v. Brooker [2007] FSR 12, para. 41 (in this case the judge did not have to decide this point). 
195 Barron (2002: 379-380, 387-388, 399), discussing the more complicated relationship between 
copyright and art. 
196 Fisher v. Brooker [2007] FSR 12, para. 36. 
197 TRIPs Agreement 1995, Art. 9 (2), Directive 2009/24/EC (Software Directive), art. 1 (2), Designers 
Guild v. Russell Williams [2001] ECDR 123, para. 25, Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace v. Svaz 
softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury [2011] FSR 18 (Case C-393/09), para. 49 (reference to the 
‘merger doctrine’). 
198 Masiyakurima (2007: 555-564). 
199 Rahmatian (2011: 131-135). 
200 A similar discussion, with different examples, can be found in Rahmatian (2005: 285-288), 
Rahmatian (2009: 574-577), Rahmatian (2011: 133-135). 
201 Above under 2. 
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work (a slavish copy obviously infringes and does not create any difficulties). It 
appears that notions of ‘storylines’, ‘historical facts’, ‘central themes’ as instances of 
non-protectable ideas are easier to grasp than non-protectable concepts of music.202 
This is also because with music the matter is more difficult: what is actually copied if 
the subject-matter of protection is supposed to be the sound, not the score?203 If 
‘ideas’, that is, building blocks of the craft of music, are taken, and that is entirely 
inevitable, then the result may well sound similar to the claimant’s pre-existing 
works, and that points towards infringement. Whether there is sufficient similarity is 
usually ascertained on the basis [p. 112] of whether an ordinary reasonably 
experienced listener may perceive it that way.204 The test of ascertaining recognisably 
copied melodies can be deceptive; one major psychological problem is that once a 
melody is recognised, especially if it is a very familiar tune, the differences between 
the claimant’s and defendant’s works are soon perceived as immaterial, and 
infringement is found potentially too readily.205 In court trials an assessment of the 
similarity of two musical works can look like this:206 
 
‘I have already referred to the fact that the six quavers which form the opening 
bar of ‘Spanish Town’ [the plaintiffs’ musical work] are … a commonplace 
series to be found in other previous musical compositions. Our attention was 
drawn, for instance, to an Austrian dance tune composed in the early 
nineteenth century by Von Lichnowsky, the opening bar of which is identical 
with that of ‘Spanish Town.’ The same sequence of notes is also to be found 
in a song entitled ‘Let Us Sing Merrily,’ although in this case there is a 
difference of tempo. In these circumstances, the fact that ‘Why’ [the 
defendants’ musical work] begins with an opening bar containing a similar, 
though not identical, phrase is of no special significance. By itself it would not 
be sufficient to warrant the inference that, if the phrase was copied, it was 
copied from the plaintiffs’ work rather than some other composition. What is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Cases therefore tend to focus on the non-literal copying of literary/dramatic works: Harman 
Pictures v. Osborne [1967] 1 WLR 723, Ravenscroft v. Herbert [1980] RPC 193, and more recently, 
Baigent v. The Random House Group [2007] EWCA Civ 247, [2007] FSR 579, CA (‘Da Vinci Code-
case’). 
203 Francis Day & Hunter v. Bron [1963] 1 Ch 587, at 608, quoting Austin v. Columbia Graphophone 
Co [1917-23] Macg. Cop. Cas. 398, at 409; Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 565, 
para. 53. 
204 Francis Day & Hunter v. Bron [1963] 1 Ch 587, at 610, 622. As to the reasonable listener standard 
in the USA, see Baxter v. MCA 812 F.2d 421, and critical comments by Keyes (2003-2004: 431-434). 
205 Discussion of this problem in Craig and Laroche (2014: 61-65) with a model composition for 
illustration (with audio file at: http://www.iposgoode.ca/?attachment_id=21753), an invention/fugato-
like piece containing melodies by Beethoven, Wagner, Britney Spears and Nirvana interwoven in the 
new piece. 
206 Francis Day & Hunter v. Bron [1963] 1 Ch 587, at 615-616. 
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significant is the fact that both in ‘Spanish Town’ and ‘Why’ the opening 
phrase enunciated in the first bar is developed over the remainder of the first 
eight bars by the use of the same devices or tricks of composition, namely, 
repetition followed by a pause, followed again by further repetition with a 
slight variation. It is this circumstance which produces the degree of similarity 
between the two compositions.’ 
 
This passage reveals three problem areas when a pre-existing work A containing 
ideas (e.g. a harmonic progression I-V-I) realised in the expression of a distinct 
melody, may be copied and infringed by a work B:  
(1) Work B shares the ideas with work A (for example the same harmonic 
progression), but not the expressions. In that case there is no infringement, but the 
example is also artificial. Ideas which do not manifest themselves in expressions are 
in reality impossible. Ideas are [p. 113] (abstract) elements of the musical grammar, 
for example, the harmonisation technique of a bass part 1-2-3 with Ib-Vc-I, types of 
cadences, a counterpoint part in the form of two notes against one in oblique or 
contrary motion, 207  figured bass, 208  accompaniment and tune formulae (also 
ornamentation formulae), rhythmic structures, structures of form (A-B-A form, 
variation, canon, dance), potentially (but with caution) standards in jazz209 and so 
forth. Where a composer invents his own grammar or elements as part of a new 
composition technique, that could be expression, because the composer would be in 
the position of a ‘writer who must provide specially vocabulary and syntax for each 
sentence he writes.’210 But if that technique becomes common standard over time 
(like twelve-tone music, which re-used old composition methods anyway) it will 
probably be considered as an idea. All these ‘ideas’ in the copyright sense can only 
enter the acoustically perceivable material world if they assume some representation 
or reification which is a form of expression in itself, embodied in some kind of 
fixation.211 In theory, if the expression merely renders the idea, and does not add 
anything at all to it, then this expression cannot attract protection.212 So the chord f-a-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 See above under 2. 
208 Discussion of the figured bass in Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [2004] EWHC 1530 (Ch.), para. 
15. See also Rahmatian (2009: 574). 
209 Craig and Laroche (2014: 48) on borrowing (in jazz and generally) and the potential artificiality of 
the interpretation that copyright requires. 
210 Instructive in Adorno, Philosophie der Neuen Musik (2003b: 101). 
211 See also Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers [1938] 1 Ch. 106, at 110. 
212 This is the ‘merger doctrine’ (especially in the United States): if there is only one way of expressing 
an idea, no protection is given, because otherwise any protection of the expression would in fact give 
protection to the idea, see e.g. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (CA-NY, 2nd Cir.1991). 
Now also at EU level in Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace v. Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo 
kultury [2011] FSR 18 (Case C-393/09), para. 49. 
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c is only the idea ‘F-major chord’ rendered acoustically or in writing. But what is the 
situation with an extremely standard harmonic progression vi-ii-V-I? The concept (vi-
ii-V-I) will be unprotectable idea, but its realisation (and there are several possibilities 
to do that) potentially could be. Distinctiveness or idiosyncrasy in the application of 
this harmonic progression (especially in combination with rhythmic and melodic 
elements) tends towards copyright protection.213    
So what aspect of the material infringes (expression taken from a pre-existing 
work which is also a substantial part of it) and what aspect is [p. 114] available to all 
(idea, such as concepts of harmonic progression in principle)? It is a legal/normative 
decision by the courts whether vi-ii-V-I really manifests only an ‘idea’ and does not 
(also) contain an expression: thus the ‘idea’ is not merely detected, it is made.214 The 
‘idea’ is conceptually a kind of Kantian thing-in-itself or Ding an sich that is 
incapable of being observed,215 being an abstraction deduced (or reduced) from its 
physical manifestation/representation or ‘expression’. Thus what we perceive is either 
a manifestation of the ‘idea’ (no protection) or a manifestation of an expression, based 
partly on the idea but something added to it (copyright protection).216 What is what is 
ultimately decided by the court in the individual case. However, some guidance as to 
which elements constitute unprotectable ideas give descriptions in music theory and 
analysis of a conceptual framework of a specific piece, for example:217 
 
‘The materials that mark the two thematic areas of [Beethoven’s piano sonata] 
Op. 49/2 are not only similar texturally (that is obvious) but melodically too: 
Fig. 128 shows this. And there is also a rhythmic similarity between the upper 
parts of bars 3 and 27. On the other hand the two themes are distinct 
harmonically in that the A theme is quite discursive with its implied V7 of IV, 
whereas the B theme hugs its tonic closely (everything is either a D major 
chord or resolves directly to one).’ 
 
What is characteristic here is that this description is a ‘reverse-engineered’ abstraction 
of the expression for the purpose of research and analysis, but it is not the expression 
itself, because nobody would be able to perform the music on the basis of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Francis Day & Hunter v. Bron [1963] 1 Ch 587, at 616 (in the passage following from the quote 
above). 
214 As Lord Hailsham put it in L.B. Plastics v Swish Products Ltd. [1979] RPC 551, 629: ‘it all depends 
on what you mean by “ideas”’. 
215 Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik (Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics) 
§13, note II (1995: 47). 
216 See also Designers Guild v. Russell Williams [2001] ECDR 123, para. 25: ‘[E]very element in the 
expression of an artistic work … is the expression of an idea on the part of the author.’ (per Ld 
Bingham). 
217 Cook (1994: 266). 
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description.218 That non-reversibility indicates that the description does not denote the 
actual protectable expression but the underlying unprotectable idea or part of it.219 
[p. 115] 
(2) Work B shares the ideas with work A, and takes over a part of the 
expressions of the work A. If that part is also a substantial part (or sufficient to make 
the individuality of the original author appear in the section taken), then there will be 
infringement. But, as the quotation above shows, the more commonplace a phrase or 
melody is, although capable of being copyright-protected in principle, the more it 
tends to be shifted towards unprotectable ideas, or alternatively, the more it is 
regarded as a work not originating from the claimant but from somewhere else, 
typically with no definite pedigree. In either case infringement would be denied. In 
that connection the blunt nature of the instrument ‘copyright’ reveals itself 
particularly well: work B sharing a substantial part of expressions in work A indicates 
infringement, but not necessarily ‘stealing’ in a musical/aesthetic sense. The concepts 
of copyright cannot accommodate creative musical borrowing (whether or not 
transformative), as it always occurred in musical history and as it appears currently 
widely in music sampling, for example in hip hop music.220 
(3) Work B shares the ideas with work A, and deliberately takes over a part of 
the expressions of the work A as a basis for a new work, for example an arrangement 
(adaptation) of work A in form of an orchestration or a variation work. The part taken 
over in work B is certainly a substantial part, and if there is no permission (licence) 
from the copyright owner of work A, then there will be infringement. However, work 
B is sufficiently independent and original (in the copyright sense) that it attracts 
copyright in its own right to the extent to which it does not infringe work A (in the 
same way as an unauthorised translation of a novel into another language). For 
example, if, by comparison with the original protected work, an arrangement exhibits 
a sufficient degree of originality, then it is capable of being a separate copyright work 
and obtains protection, and the degree of originality is no different from what is 
required to establish copyright in any other work.221 Where work B was only inspired 
by work A, there is no infringement at all.222 The separate nature (and copyright 
protection) of orchestral arrangements, for example, is not in doubt as [p. 116] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 But one would be able to on the basis of the extract of the score in fig. 128 that has been 
mentioned). 
219 See also Rahmatian (2011: 134-135), and Rahmatian (2005: 287) with different examples, including 
one from a letter by Mozart describing in words the realisation in his composition of a dramatic scene 
in the Abduction from the Seraglio. 
220 Arewa (2005-2006: 547, 550, 558, 579-586, 610-612, 615-618, 624-628, 630-634). 
221 Fisher v. Brooker [2007] FSR 12, para. 44. 
222 Fisher v. Brooker [2007] FSR 12, para. 36, leaving aside that J. S. Bach’s music is not protected by 
copyright anyway. 
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such,223 but what is simple adaptation and what is sufficiently independent work (or 
contribution) is a matter of fact and degree,224 and is ultimately decided by the court 
in each individual case. We are also confronted here again with the issue as to when a 
musical performance of work A departs so significantly from the canon of acceptable 
performances that it could be regarded as an independent new work B,225 being an 
adaptation or arrangement of the work A, and therefore attracting copyright as a 
composition in its own right.226 
 
 
5 Copyright transforming the work of music into a ‘musical work’ and 
property right: does that reflect the composers’ and performers’ idea of 
music? 
 
Music is an entirely time-dependent process, a temporal structure; it reflects the inner 
awareness of time, is abstract and ephemeral, and naturally cannot be possessed and 
allocated. However, that is what the law in its property system, that is, copyright 
system, seeks to do when it grants protection for ‘music’. The law transforms the 
music into discernable and static entities, ‘musical works’, to which legal rights can 
attach, in some ways like a ladle having scooped water from a flowing brook to make 
the water controllable and capable of being owned. The emphasis on the notation, the 
writing or fixation as a prerequisite for copyright protection, underlines this, although 
the law acknowledges that the written notes are not the music, it is the performed 
sound. The sound recording counteracts the fleeting nature of music today, far more 
than the classical written score could ever do:227 music becomes an available object 
and is no longer a fashioned period of time only. The ‘musical work’ is a normative 
definition, overlapping, but not coinciding with what musicians regard as music. This 
definition uses aspects of the [p. 117] elements of music, such as melody, harmony, 
counterpoint, form, but not systematically, and these building blocks of music are 
designed to create music, not legal protection, so they are of limited use as a basis for 
establishing copyright protection. Copyright law also divides composition from 
performance and allocates different rights to either, although in reality one 
precipitates the other and they are often inseparable in the creative process, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Godfrey v. Lees [1995] EMLR 307, Beckingham v. Hodgens [2002] EWHC 2143 (Ch), [2002] 
EMLR 45. 
224 As one can see from the reasoning of Fisher v. Brooker [2007] FSR 12, paras. 41-42. 
225 Compare the discussion in chapter 3 by Martin Parker Dixon on the interpretation of J. S. Bach’s by 
Glenn Gould, turning Bach into ‘Gould’s Bach’. With Gould’s interpretation of Mozart’s piano music 
this is definitely true, in various ways. 
226 Coffey v. Warner/Chappell Music [2005] ECDR 21. 
227 Ashby (2010: 28-33). 
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example in improvisation. As a result, authorship and entitlement (copyright 
ownership, especially to found claims to royalties) become difficult to ascertain, 
particularly in the usual scenario of collaboration of several composers/performers or 
‘musicians’.228 
The legal transformation of music into ‘musical works’ by copyright law and 
the factual transformation of music into recorded past musical performances by sound 
recordings are essential to the commodification and commercialisation of music.229 
Copyright reflects the composers’ and performers’ idea of music very imperfectly 
only. However, it is doubtful whether copyright law intends to reflect fully the nature 
of music and music performance in its protection mechanism for music. What it does, 
and it seems that this is the predominant concern, is to create a notional black box of 
property into which the art of music is squeezed to render it a controllable object of 
property that can be owned, defended against infringers, transferred against payment 
and commodified in other ways, for example (increasingly) in the form of 
speculation. Therefore the law apparently does not need to have a too sophisticated 
understanding of the object of protection, the music. Whether the art of music making 
suffers through this treatment is secondary because once the music is an object of 
property, a price can be put to it and a commercial value allocated which is essential 
to business and commercialisation. The copyright-protected musical work is then 
similar to a share in a company, not expressing the true quality of the enterprise and 
its products, but having a notional value, perceived or fixed by the market (e.g. the 
stock exchange) at a given time, and largely independent from any intrinsic and 
possibly non-pecuniary values of the company. So the black box of copyright 
property may not have to contain much ‘art’ or ‘music’ at all, and discussions about 
whether the quality of modern music of all styles is promoted or damaged by 
copyright and the music business, can become redundant, because these aspects can 
be relegated to aesthetic quibbles of an irrelevant élite of artists and art critics. The 
cultural industries [p. 118] effectively have operated on this basis for a long time.230 
Even an empty shell is perceived as valuable, so long as it is alienable against money. 
Obviously, one cannot blame copyright for that: copyright is just a tool, used and 
shaped by human actors. It depends on them which task copyright is supposed to 
fulfil. If copyright is meant to be a commodification device for music, then it plays its 
role well. If copyright is understood as a gentle protective support for the unique art 
form of music and its creators, then it needs substantial retuning.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 See chapter 6 by Alison Firth. 
229 Rahmatian (2005: 274-275, 285, 288) with further references. 
230 A famous critic of this state of affairs was Adorno, as is well known. See e.g., Horkheimer and 
Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung (1986: 118-129) (The section on the cultural industry – 
‘Kulturindustrie’ – is likely to have been written mostly by Adorno).  
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